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CASENOTES
CONFLICTS OF LAW: CONFLICTS BRING HARMONY
TO THE PICTURE WHEN FOCUSING UPON
PUBLICITY RIGHTS
Money for nothing, prints for free! When it comes to the right of
publicity, British rockers may lose to the tune of big profits.
One threat to musicians' rights in Great Britain is staged in the
arena of conflict of laws. Conflict of laws focuses upon which state's or
which country's laws should be applied during a legal dispute. In Bi-Rite
Enterprises v. Bruce Miner Co. ,' the First Circuit Court of Appeals held
that rights relating to commercial exploitation of names or likenesses of
British musicians were not governed by the law of Great Britain which
did not recognize these "rights of publicity." Rather, the law of the
United States, which recognizes the right of publicity, should apply.2
Furthermore, the court was forced to use a balancing test to arrive at its
conclusion because the issue was one of conflict of laws, where rigid rules
rarely exist.
FACTS
The plaintiffs in Bi-Rite included Bi-Rite Enterprises, an Illinois
corporation, and Artemis Inc., a Connecticut corporation, who both
manufactured and distributed novelty merchandise which included pos-
ters of British performers.' Members of the British rock groups Judas
Priest, Iron Maiden and Duran Duran ("the performers") were also
plaintiffs in this case. These performers had licensed commercial ex-
ploitation of their names and likenesses4 to Bi-Rite and Artemis through
their United States merchandising representative, the Great Southern
Co. Inc., a Massachusetts corporation.' The defendants, Bruce Miner
and the Bruce Miner Co. Inc., a Massachusetts corporation, distributed
1. Bi-Rite Enters. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440 (lst Cir. 1985).
2. Id. at 446.
3. Id. at 441. An exclusive license is permission to do a thing (here to distribute posters)
and a contract not to give leave to anyone else to do the same thing. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 507 (5th ed. 1979).
4. Here, Bi-Rite and Artemis were given the licenses to exploit the performers commer-
cially through the selling of posters.
5. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 441. The Great Southern Co. was not a party to this action.
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posters of popular music performers.6 Neither the defendants nor the
European manufacturers from whom they purchased posters held
licenses from any of the depicted British performers.7
This case arose when Bruce Miner Co. began distributing posters of
the performers, claiming that they were made from publicity photo-
graphs legally purchased by the European manufacturers.' Bi-Rite, Ar-
temis and the performers sued Bruce Miner and the Bruce Miner Co.
because the performers had already given Bi-Rite and Artemis the exclu-
sive license to distribute their posters.9
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued a preliminary injunction that prohibited the Bruce Miner Co. from
distributing posters depicting any of the performers, individually or in a
group, from whom Bi-Rite or Artemis held an exclusive license."0 The
sole issue on appeal was whether the performers' rights of publicity were
governed by British law or United States law.'" The First Circuit af-
firmed the District Court's ruling that United States law applied. 2
United States law and British law are diametrically opposed on the
issue of whether a right of publicity exists. American jurisdictions recog-
nize the right of well-known individuals to control the commercial ex-
ploitation of their names and likenesses.' 3 Such an individual has an
exclusive right to a type of trade name, one's own, and a kind of trade-
mark in one's likeness that can be capitalized on by selling licenses.' 4
Great Britain, however, does not recognize a right of publicity. 5 Thus,
the choice between United States and British law was determinative in
this case.' 6
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. See supra note 3 regarding exclusive licenses.
10. Id. at 441-42. The district court opinion was not published.
11. Id. at 442.
12. Id.
13. See Haelon Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (where the
court calls this right the "right of publicity"). See also PROSSER AND KEATON, THE LAW OF
TORTS at 851 (5th ed. 1984) (where this right is recognized under the rubric of the tort of
"appropriation" of name or likeness).
14. PROSSER AND KEATON, THE LAW OF TORTS at 854 (5th ed. 1984).
15. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 442 (citing Tolley v. Fry, 1 K.B. 467 (1930)).
16. Id. The choice is determinative because if United States law applies then the British
performers have a right of publicity that will be recognized by the Bi-Rite court; however, if
British law applies then the performers have no publicity rights to be recognized and subse-
quently the defendants would win.
A brief look at the evolution of the law of conflicts in the United States is befitting at this
point. The rules of the original RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS were derived from the
vested rights doctrine which called for the enforcement everywhere of rights that had been
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FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
In deciding which law to apply, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
first acknowledged that, as a federal court exercising pendent jurisdiction
over a state law claim, it must apply the substantive law of the state
wherein it sits. 17 Consequently, it must adhere to the forum state's
choice of law rules. I" Thus, the First Circuit applied the choice of law
rules of Massachusetts.' 9
The appellate court recognized that Massachusetts' choice of law
rules were in transition from the application of a rigid, single-factor anal-
ysis associated with the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) to a
more flexible multiple-factor analysis espoused by the Restatement (Sec-
lawfully created under the local law of a state. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS 412 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. The doctrine pro-
vided for the application of the local law of the state in which the last act had occurred that
was necessary to bring a legal obligation into existence. Id. Thus, in the case of torts, the state
of the last act was the state where the injury had occurred. Id. Alternatively, in the case of
contracts, it was in the state where the contract was made. Id. The court in Bi-Rite recognized
that under this older approach, courts determined which laws governed by categorizing the
action (as a tort or contract dispute, for example) and then looking to a single connecting
factor (such as place of injury or place of agreement). Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 442.
This rigid single-factor rule has since changed to a more flexible approach. The vested
rights doctrine was inconsistent with the basic statement of method given in § 5, Comment b
of the original Restatement: "Sources of Conflict of Laws. Each court derives (its choice of
law rules) from the same sources used in determining all its law: from precedent, from anal-
ogy, from legal reason and from consideration of ethical and social need." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) 413 (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed. 1934)). It did not make
sense to decide that a state's law should govern due to the fortuitous event of an injury occur-
ring there when that state may actually only bear a slight relationship to the injury and the
parties. As such, the vested rights approach has been rejected in many of the chapters of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND). See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) chs. 7, 8. For example, the
rights and liabilities of the parties in tort are governed by the local law of the state which, with
respect to the particular issue, has the "most significant relationship" to the occurrence and
the parties. Id. at 413. Similarly, the applicable law in a contract case is the local law of the
state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the "most significant relationship" to the
transaction and the parties. Id. at §§ 185, 188.
Finally, it is relevant to note that the factors listed in § 6(2) of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) (explained in the text of this casenote) are considered important principles underlying
choice of law rules and they permeate most of the remaining rules in the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND). See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 145, 188. With the newer approach, the judges
give greater weight to the choice of law policies stated in § 6 than to the demands of a legal
theory like that of vested rights. Id. at 413. Although the newer approach appears fairer, in
that judges will now look to many factors and balance them, this fairness has come with a
price tag of uncertainty. As with any balancing test there is less predictability in the result and
a possibility that the most determinative factor of the case will now be who is doing the
balancing.
17. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 442 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
(1966) and Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
18. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 442 (citing Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)).
19. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 442.
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ond) of Conflict of Laws (1971) (hereinafter "Restatement (Second)").2
Additionally, the appellate court used precedent to show where the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts first rejected a single-factor
test z' and later in another case amplified its commitment to a more func-
tional analysis.22 Finally, the First Circuit relied on a previous Massa-
chusetts decision which "made clear that the relevant factors for
consideration are those set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws section 6(2). ,23 Thus, the First Circuit concluded that Massa-
chusetts case law regarding choice of law rules more closely followed the
Restatement (Second) section 6(2), which sets forth the parameters for
the analysis to be used in Bi-Rite.24
The Restatement (Second) section 6(2) states:
When there is no [contrary statutory] directive, the factors
relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international
systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states
and the relevant interests of those states in the deter-
mination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field
of law,
(f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of re-
sult, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied.25
Before the appellate court applied these factors to the case at hand,
it first rejected defendant Bruce Miner's argument that the only factor to
be considered was the domicile of the person whose name or likeness was
being exploited. 26 The appellate court stated that to focus solely on this
20. Id.
21. Id. at 443 (citing Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976)).
22. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 442-43 (citing Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Servs., 378 Mass.
535, 392 N.E.2d 1045 (1979)).
23. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 443 (citing Bushkin Assocs. v. Raytheon Co., 393 Mass. 622, 473
N.E.2d 662 (1985)).
24. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 443.
25. Id. at 444 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (2d ed.
1971)).
26. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 443.
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single factor would do a disservice to Massachusetts' choice of law rules
which call for a "more functional" or multi-factor test.27 Thus, a court
should address the domicile issue only if it implicates interests under the
newer approach to choice of law.2" Having disposed of defendant Bruce
Miner's argument, the appellate court proceeded to analyze the facts of
the case in relation to the factors listed in the Restatement (Second).
The first factor the appellate court analyzed was "the needs of the
international systems"; here, the United States and British systems.29
The court reasoned that in the popular music industry, trade between
these two countries is important and is nurtured by having both coun-
tries afford the same commercial rights to foreigners as to nationals.30
To do otherwise, such as by applying the law of Great Britain to the
American merchandising activities of British performers (as defendant
Bruce Miner urged), would have extended fewer commercial rights to
British performers than to American performers.3" Such a result would
be contrary to the needs of the international system.
Next, the court looked to the second factor which is "the relevant
policies of the forum"; here, Massachusetts.32 The appellate court deter-
mined that Massachusetts recognizes a right of publicity. 3 Since none of
the plaintiffs were domiciled in Massachusetts, however, the court had to
look to the laws of the other jurisdictions involved to discern their poli-
cies regarding the right of publicity.34 Illinois, where plaintiff Bi-Rite
was incorporated, Connecticut, where plaintiff Artemis was incorpo-
rated, and Georgia, where the performers' merchandising representative
was incorporated all recognize the right of publicity and they share the
basic policy interest underlying the right.35
At this point, the court analyzed the third factor which is "the rele-
vant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 444.
30. Id.
31. Id. (where the court explained that if British law applied then a British performer
could not enter into an exclusive license agreement with an American merchandiser while an
American performer could).
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly, 379 Mass. 745, 400 N.E.2d 847 (1980)).
34. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 444. The court stated that in the interests of comity (where the
court in one state will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as a matter
of obligation, but out of deference and respect) it must look to the other jurisdictions involved.
35. Id. (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977): "The
protection provides an economic incentive for him (the performer) to make the investment
required to produce a performance of interest to the public. This same consideration underlies
the patent and copyright laws long enforced by this court.")
19871
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states in the determination of the particular issue."36 Recall that Great
Britain does not recognize the right of publicity.3 7 The appellate court
assumed that Great Britain's refusal to recognize this right was a policy
choice favoring unrestricted competition in the area of commercial ex-
ploitation of names and likenesses.38 Nevertheless, the court reasoned
that to recognize American publicity rights for British performers would
not restrict free commerce in Britain.39 Britain's interest in allowing its
citizens unrestricted access to the names and likenesses of performers
would not be abrogated by allowing those performers to restrict the mer-
chandising of their names and likenesses in the United States.' The
court concluded here that the British public would not be harmed by the
laws of the United States aggrandizing British performers.4'
The fourth consideration under the Restatement (Second) is "the
protection of justified expectations."42 On the one hand, the American
merchandisers justifiably expected that the British performers had the
right to license their publicity rights.43 On the other hand, Bruce Miner
Co. essentially argued that it had a justified expectation that it could le-
gally distribute its posters because the underlying photographs were pub-
licity shots which photographers had previously sold to European poster
manufacturers." According to Bruce Miner Co., the photographs for
36. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 444-45.
37. Tolley v. Fry, 1 K.B. 467 (1930).
38. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 445. The court stated that "i]n the area of publicity rights, as in
the areas of trademark, patent, and copyright, the law must balance the competing goals, on
the one hand, of facilitating public access to valuable images, inventions, and ideas and, on the
other, rewarding individual effort." Cf Fashion Orig'ors Guild of America v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (fashion designs defined as an area in American law where the
public interest is thought to be best served by allowing unrestricted competitive commerce in
images and information).
39. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 445.
40. Id.
41. Id. One might question, for future application of the rule in this case, what the court
would have done had it concluded that the British would be harmed by the laws of the United
States aggrandizing British performers-what would the court have concluded if the United
States law and the British law could not co-exist as they can here? Guidance for the court
regarding this fourth factor under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) can be found under § 6(2)
comment f, where it states "[fthe forum should seek to reach a result that will achieve the best
possible accommodation of these (the other interested states) policies. The forum should also
appraise the relative interests of the states involved in the determination of the particular is-
sue." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) comment f (2d ed. 1971).
Although this comment does not squarely address the question of what to do when the inter-
ested states laws cannot co-exist, the comment does imply that in all situations it is up to the
court to achieve the best results possible for all those involved.
42. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 444.
43. Id. at 445.
44. Id.
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the posters were taken "at unrestricted photosessions" conducted with-
out any discussion of the limitations on the subsequent use of the
photos.45 The performers had posed at these sessions with the under-
standing that the photographers could do whatever they wished with the
pictures.
The First Circuit, however, did not agree with Bruce Miner Co.
The company's argument was too broad. The court conceded that Brit-
ish performers who participated in unrestricted photosessions should
have known that under British law they had no rights of publicity.46
Nevertheless, this did not mean that these performers intended to convey
their American publicity rights to the photographers. The British law
applies to uses in Great Britain and not to uses in other countries.17
At this juncture, without explicit consideration of the remaining Re-
statement (Second) factors, the appellate court made the blanket conclu-
sion that "[i]n the case at bar, the law of the United States governs. "48
The court further held that it has been long established in the United
States that " '[b]y authorizing photographs, a performer does not, with-
out more, license their commercial exploitation'."49 Thus, the court con-
cluded, the consequences of posing for photographs in Great Britain did
not mean that these same consequences occur with respect to the per-
formers' American publicity rights.5 °
The last step in the court's analysis, after it concluded that United
States law applied, was to put the final factors of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) together and briefly consider them.' Certainty, predictability, and
uniformity of result and ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied, were all weighed in favor of the application of Ameri-
can law.52 The court reasoned that basing publicity rights on the nation-
ality of the performer was confusing, anomalous, unworkable and would
create uncertainty for foreign performers.5" Therefore, the appellate
45. Id.
46. Id. at 445-46.
47. Id. at 446. Also note that in this case all of the photographs were taken in Great
Britain so no other country came into the picture. If the photographs were taken in another
country, for example in Ireland, then that country's laws regarding publicity rights and un-
restricted versus restricted photosessions would also have to be taken into account by the
court.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 446 (citing Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
50. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 446.
51. Id. Note that the consideration of the final factors of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
came in the last paragraph of the court's analysis, almost as an afterthought.
52. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 446.
53. Id.
1987]
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court affirmed the district court's holding that the laws of the American
jurisdictions should apply to this case.
ANALYSIS
A cursory view of the case suggests that the decision is advanta-
geous to the entertainment industry because the law of the United States
was applied to protect performers' rights of publicity. This case, how-
ever, is not as advantageous to the industry as one might have hoped.
This is because the case was based on a balancing and weighing of differ-
ent policies and interests and no guarantee exists that a future court will
view the same interests in the same way. Furthermore, each state has its
own choice of law rules that dictate which jurisdictions' laws to apply,
what policies and interests should be weighed and how that weighing is
to be done. 4
By analyzing the court's reasoning, it is arguable that the court ex-
aggerated the clarity of the Massachusetts choice of law rules in an at-
tempt to grapple with the confusing area of conflict of laws.
Massachusetts' choice of law rules have changed from applying a single-
factor test to a multiple-factor test;5" however, the Massachusetts choice
of law rules dictate no one exact multiple-factor test.
The appellate court cited earlier case law which supposedly "made
clear that the relevant factors for consideration are those set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 6(2). ''56 This arguably
misstates that earlier decision.57 The issue in the previous case was also
54. In the end it depends on which state's choice of law rules are being applied. One
suggestion on how to avoid the area of conflict of laws is for the United States lawyer con-
tracting with foreign performers to incorporate a provision in the contract stating that the
client and the other party have agreed that American law (and more specifically which state's
law) will apply in any litigation arising out of or relating to the contract. If a provision like
this is spelled out in the contract it is much more likely that a court will apply the state's law
that the parties agreed to. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 187 (the state chosen by the
parties to govern the litigation will be applied).
55. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 442.
56. Id. at 443 (citing Bushkin Assocs. v. Raytheon Co., 393 Mass. 622, 473 N.E.2d 662
(1985)).
57. See, e.g., Travenol Labs. v. Zotal, 394 Mass. 95, 474 N.E.2d 1070 (D. Mass. 1985)
(where the court stated -[i]n our recent decision in Bushkin ..., we adopted the general
principles advanced in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971), with re-
spect to the resolution of conflicts problems involving contracts") (emphasis added). Cf Flotech,
Inc. & Fluoramics, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Co., 627 F. Supp. 358, 362 (D. Mass.
1985) (court cited to Bushkin and used the factors set out in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§ 6(2) when it resolved a conflict of laws issue involving a complaint for product defamation,
product disparagement, unfair trade practices and deceptive trade practices). In Bi-Rite the
issue centers around rights of publicity and not contract rights per se.
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one of conflicts and whether Massachusetts' or New York's statute of
frauds should be applied in an action involving an alleged oral contract
between plaintiff and defendant.5" In deciding the issue the court stated,
"[o]ne obvious source of guidance is the Restatement (Second)," 59 and
they emphasized the factors in section 6(2). That court acknowledged,
however, that they felt free to borrow from any of the various lists of
factors that were relevant to their case.' In the particular case at bench
the court decided that those factors in section 6(2) of the Restatement
(Second) were relevant, but the court did not state that those factors
would be relevant in every case. The Bi-Rite court exaggerated the previ-
ous case's holding by stating emphatically that it made clear that the
relevant factors to consider were those in section 6(2).
Furthermore, though the court in Bi-Rite stated that the "better de-
cision" is obvious, 61 this is not so easily seen. The court makes a blanket
conclusion that a rule basing publicity rights on the performer's national-
ity would give rise to unnecessary confusion, be unworkable and create
tremendous uncertainty.62 The court, however, does not state its support
or reasoning for this conclusion (apparently because it was so obvious).
Upon careful consideration of the inherent problems with a rule bas-
ing publicity rights on the performer's nationality, the court's conclusion
to reject the rule appears meritorious. Such a rule would place the court
in the unenviable position of defining a performer's nationality. Is it
where the performer is born, or domiciled or something else? Similarly,
what would the court do with a group whose members were born in or
lived in different countries? Needless to say, the Bi-Rite court decided
that a rule basing publicity rights on the performer's nationality should
be avoided. Finally, equity dictates that foreign performers have the ad-
vantage of American law when dealing with or granting licenses to
American producers and merchandisers.
Obviously, American lawyers will favor the Bi-Rite decision because
it applied the United States law. They must be cautious, however, be-
cause when it comes to the rights of publicity, and more specifically, pho-
tographic rights, the picture remains unclear. Later courts might not tip
58. Bushkin, 393 Mass. at 625, 473 N.E.2d at 664.
59. Id. at 669.
60. Id. at 670.
61. Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 446.
62. Id.
1987]
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the scales in favor of American producers and their exclusive licensors.
The next court just might leave foreign rockers singing the blues!
Alison R. Mashin
